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Abstract—The iris biometrics is considered one of the most
accurate and robust methods of the identity verification. The
unique iris features of an individual can be presented in a com-
pact binary form which can be easily compared with the ref-
erence template to confirm identity. However in contrast to
passwords and PINs biometric authentication factors cannot
be revoked and changed as they are inherently connected to
our characteristics. Once the biometric information is com-
promised or disclosed it became useless for the purpose of au-
thentication. Therefore there is a need to perform iris features
matching without revealing the features itself and the refer-
ence template. We propose an extension of the standard iris-
based verification protocol which introduces a features and
template locking mechanism, which guarantee that no sensi-
tive information is exposed. Presented solutions can be eas-
ily integrated into authentication mechanisms used in modern
computer networks.
Keywords—authentication, biometrics, iris recognition, privacy
preserving.
1. Introduction
Among the biometric veriﬁcation methods iris recognition
is considered one of the most accurate and robust. Iris
features can be easily extracted from eye images and they
can be eﬃciently compared. However if the biometric ref-
erence template or set of biometric features are disclosed,
the whole biometric system becomes useless for an indi-
vidual, because the biometric information cannot be can-
celed or revoked as passwords. Therefore there is a need to
perform iris features matching without revealing either the
biometric data acquired during the veriﬁcation process or
the reference template from the database. In this paper we
introduce a privacy preserving system for iris-based bio-
metric identity veriﬁcation. Firstly we propose a method in
which iris biometric templates stored by the authenticator
are locked with the keys known only to the data owner.
In this scenario even when the database is compromised
no private information is exposed. Secondly we introduce
a privacy preserving veriﬁcation protocol, which is based
on the secure multi-party computation techniques.
2. Iris Biometrics
An iris is the colored ring around the pupil. Its structure
is determined during the fetal development of the eye and
remains unchanged. On contrary the color of the iris can
change as a result of the variable pigmentation in tissues.
The main role of the iris is to control the size of the pupil
and adjust the amount of light which enters through the
pupil into the eye interior. It is surrounded by the sclera,
which is a white area of tissues and blood vessels, and it
is covered by a transparent layer called cornea. The whole
iris is visible only with eyes wide open, as eyelids and eye-
lashes usually occludes the lower and upper part of it. The
possibility of using the iris to distinguish individuals is over
100 years old, but the ﬁrst patent for the automated iris bio-
metric system was obtained by Flom and Saﬁr in 1987 [1].
However the most important work in the ﬁeld of the iris
recognition was due to Daugman [2], [3]. He introduced
ﬁrst practically veriﬁed methods for iris image segmenta-
tion, unique feature extraction and matching, which with
slight modiﬁcations are used today world widely and which
are the reference models for other algorithms.
Fig. 1. An example eye image captured in infrared light with
outer and inner boundaries approximsted by non-cocentric circles
[www.biometriclabs.pl].
For the purpose of biometrics the eye image is captured
in the near infrared light with the wavelengths between
700 – 900 nm. Usually special infrared illuminators and
bandpass lens ﬁlters are used to acquire a image of good
quality [4]. The infrared light reveals the detailed struc-
ture of the iris better than the visible light [5]. The iris
is usually modeled as a ring with outer and inner border
approximated by two circles which are nearly concentric.
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Figure 1 shows an example image acquired in infrared light
with the iris and pupil approximated by two circles. Be-
cause the iris area is hardly ever fully visible an additional
mask is applied to the ring, which marks the areas where
eyelids and eyelashes occlude the iris region. Optionally
this mask also indicates image artifacts such as specular
reﬂections from illuminators.
After the iris region is isolated, it is mapped into normal-
ized pseudo-polar coordinate system [5]. Every point of
the iris area is described by two coordinates: the angle
α and the radial distance r. When the pupil and the iris
centre overlap, r is the normalized distance from the iris
pupil centre, and α is the angle of the line crossing the
point and the pupil centre. Figure 2 shows an iris mapped
into pseudo-polar coordinates. The resulting rectangular
image has two important properties. Firstly the mapping
models linear stretches of the iris, when the pupil contracts
or dilates, which is regarded a good approximation of its
nature [6]. Secondly the eye or head rotation is equivalent
to the permutation of points in the α coordinate, so these
eﬀects can be easily compensated.
Fig. 2. An example iris image (a), iris image converted to pseudo-
polar coordinates (b) and occlusions mask in pseudo-polar coor-
dinates (c).
Most of the iris biometric methods convolve the trans-
formed image with 2-dimensional ﬁlters designed to ex-
tract the unique iris texture patterns. Many diﬀerent ﬁlters
were tested but the best results were obtained for Gabor,
Log-Gabor, Haar and Laplacian of Gaussian ﬁlters [3],
[7]–[11]. The resulting values are re-sampled and quan-
tized. Daugman proposed that only the sign of the ﬁltered
signal should be used as features. He introduced a binary
iris representation which is summarized in 2048 bits vector,
called an “iris code”. Many other solutions follow this ap-
proach as it allows the iris codes to be compared eﬃciently
using bitwise operations [2].
The iris code matching is based on the Hamming dis-
tance. The Hamming distance measures the fraction of
corresponding bits of two binary vectors that disagree. Be-
cause not all of the bits of the iris code are valid due to
occlusions and other disruptions, a modiﬁed Hamming dis-
tance must be introduced that take this into account. It can
be implemented using three types of operations: bitwise
XOR (⊕), bitwise AND (∧) and bit counting as follows:
HD(x,w,y,m) = ∑i (xi⊕ yi)∧wi∧mi∑i wi∧mi
, (1)
where x and y are two iris codes and w and m are the oc-
clusions masks, whose bits are set if the corresponding bits
of the iris codes are valid. To account for the eye rotation,
the Hamming distance is computed for several diﬀerent per-
mutations of the bits corresponding to the diﬀerent angles
of rotations. At the end the minimal score is compared
with the predeﬁned threshold to check if the veriﬁcation is
successful.
3. Preserving Iris Code Privacy
Vernam’s cryptographic system, known also as one-time
pad is a type of encryption method, which has been proven
to be impossible to crack if used properly [12]. The main
idea is that the plaintext is encrypted with a substitution
cipher using a secret random key. The size of the key
must be equal to the size of the plaintext. As long as the
key is truly random, and as large as plaintext, the resulting
cipher text is also truly random. For the binary data the
substitution Vernamñs system can be implemented based on
cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
and XOR operation. The pseudo-random number generator
is used to prepare a key, and the XOR operation is used
to randomly invert the bit values based on the key bits.
One-time pad is a symmetric encryption mechanism, as
the XOR operation when used twice with the same key
reveals the original plaintext. The main idea behind the
privacy preserving iris based veriﬁcation is that iris codes
encrypted with one-time pad can be matched in the same
way as unencrypted ones. The Hamming distance of two
iris codes before and after encryption remain the same, as
long as the keys used to encrypt them are identical. It
is because the XOR operation used for Hamming distance
computing nulliﬁes the encryption as follows:
enc⊕(x,k)⊕ enc⊕(y,k) = x⊕ k⊕ y⊕ k = x⊕ y . (2)
The biometric features of the same individual diﬀer each
time the biometric measurements are done. For the iris bio-
metrics this variability is mainly due to changing capture
conditions and image processing. These processes intro-
duce a noise to the iris code. Whether the noise is a user
116
Privacy Preserving and Secure Iris-Based Biometric Authentication for Computer Networks
Fig. 3. A sequence diagram for the privacy preserving iris based biometric authentication protocol with two parties
characteristic or not is still an open question. Nevertheless
we can assume that for each individual there exists an ideal
iris code x and there is a measurement speciﬁc noise z.
The real iris code can be expressed as a XOR operation
between the ideal iris code x and the measurement noise z.
In that situation the noise determines the Hamming distance
between two iris codes of the same individual.
Now if we use the same cryptographic key in the Vernam’s
cipher for diﬀerent real iris codes of the same individual
we may reveal the information about the noise but the ideal
iris code remains encrypted. The iris code matching routine
will not only nullify the encryption but also the ideal iris
code. The adversary will be able to determine the character
of the noise but will deduce nothing about the ideal iris
code.
The presented encryption of iris code has some other inter-
esting features. The experiments indicate that there is only
about 100 to 200 bits of information in the iris code in
the Shannon sense [13]. This suggests that the bits of iris
codes are strongly dependent. The one-time pad encryption
removes the bit dependencies in the ciphertexts if the key
used has its bits independent. As a result the encrypted
iris code will be indistinguishable from random data for
an adversary.
4. Two-Party Protocol
The privacy preserving iris based biometric authentication
protocol is based on the secure multi-party computation
scheme and applies the one-time pad encryption of iris
code presented in the previous section.
There are two parties in this process, which we will later
call: Alice and Bob. Alice represents a user who is willing
to undergo biometric veriﬁcation. She does not want her
biometric data (namely the iris code and the binary occlu-
sions mask) to be disclosed to any other party. Bob rep-
resents an authentication server which veriﬁes Alice iden-
tity based on her biometric data. Bob has access to the
encrypted biometric templates database, which he does not
want to disclose to anyone. The authentication protocol pre-
sented in this paper employs several proven cryptographic
methods. The ﬁrst one is the cryptographic one-way func-
tion called later hash function [14], [15]. It is a determin-
istic procedure which takes an arbitrary binary vector and
transforms it into ﬁxed size bit string, called a hash value.
The transformation has some fundamental properties.
It is easy to compute the hash, but it is infeasible to recover
the binary vector from hash value. It is infeasible to ﬁnd
two binary vectors with the same hash or modify the binary
vector without changing its hash. a sample hash function
suitable for our solution could be SHA-2. The authen-
tication scheme uses also a secure channel establishment
techniques [14], [15]. There are many algorithms which
can be used for that purpose. The protocol also requires
cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
(CSPRNG). It is a pseudo-random generator, which has
a very long period, and which satisﬁes the “next-bit test”
and withstands “state compromise extensions” [14], [15].
When Alice is enrolled to the biometric system, she is as-
signed a unique identiﬁer i. Next she uses a trusted bio-
metric device, which captures her iris images and generates
her reference iris code t(i) with optional occlusions mask
m(i). Then a cryptographically secure pseudo-random num-
ber generator creates a secret encryption key k. The key is
used to encrypt the reference iris code y(i) = enc(x(i),k).
The hash value of the key is computed h(i) = hash(k) and
the key is released to Alice. The hash code is needed in
the veriﬁcation process to prove that Bob possesses the en-
crypted template of Alice. Bob does not have the access to
the encryption key. Instead he receives encrypted reference
iris code with associated mask and the hash value of the
key {y(i),m(i),h(i)} and he inserts them into his database,
which is indexed with the identiﬁcation numbers i. After-
wards the system is ready for biometric veriﬁcation.
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The veriﬁcation process is shown in Fig. 3. When Alice
wants to verify herself to Bob she initializes the secure
communication channel. Then she generates a random num-
ber q and send it securely to the Bob together with her
claimed identity i. Bob uses the random value q and the
hash value of i-th key h(i) to prove Alice that her template
is in the database. Additionally he generates a random
number o, which will be used by Alice to prove that she
owns the proper key. Bob sends Alice the number o and the
proof h∗∗. After the proof is checked by Alice, the biomet-
ric system captures her iris image and extract her iris code
x with the associated occlusions mask w. The iris code is
encrypted with the secret key k and the proof h∗ based on o
is prepared. The encrypted iris code x∗ with the occlusion
mask w and the proof h∗ are sent to Bob. Bob veriﬁes
the proof and calculates the Hamming distance between
the encrypted iris code from Alice and the corresponding
encrypted template from database (using the bitwise XOR
operation, bitwise AND operation and bit counting). If
the resulting score is lower than a predeﬁned dissimilarity
threshold the veriﬁcation is considered successful.
5. Conclusions
The presented methods allow to authenticate an individual
based on the iris biometrics without revealing the informa-
tion about the biometric features. These methods use the
speciﬁc proprieties of the iris code and its matching rou-
tines, and employ proven and veriﬁed cryptographic tech-
niques. The presented protocol can be incorporated into
existing authentication schemes used in the computer net-
works. The author of this paper is working on the speciﬁ-
cation and the reference implementation of authentication
server and client, which will use the Extensible Authen-
tication Protocol (EAP) family adapted to the presented
biometric requirements. Our future work will focus on in-
vestigating the iris code noise properties. It is essential for
the presented protocol to discover how much individual-
speciﬁc information is still present in the noise, and what
can be done to make the noise more random.
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